Compare the written mandate, not the job title. Our proposed test for buyer representation is whether the adviser must investigate adverse evidence, disclose competing interests and recommend declining the car when appropriate.
The following are contract structures to negotiate, not claims about prevailing market tariffs:
| Fee structure | Useful feature | Incentive or scope issue | Recommended contractual protection |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fixed research fee | Defined expenditure for an evidence-based decision, including a decision not to buy | A vague scope may produce an attractive report without resolving the buyer’s questions | Specify candidates, research questions, deliverables, exclusions and revision limits |
| Hourly or staged diligence | Flexible where archive research or ownership history is uncertain | Expenditure can expand before the buyer receives a decision | Set approval caps, progress checkpoints and stop-work triggers |
| Percentage success fee | Links payment to completion | Remuneration increases with transaction value and depends on a purchase occurring | Define the fee base, cap, termination rights and treatment of previously known cars |
| Fixed fee plus completion fee | Separates research work from transaction execution | The completion incentive remains | Require disclosure and approval of each component before sourcing begins |
No defensible universal buying-agent fee was established in this research. Obtain competing written scopes in dollars rather than treating a broad percentage range as a tariff. Ask whether the quoted fee includes negotiation, travel, inspection coordination, title work and post-purchase administration—or merely an introduction.
A useful engagement letter should answer five questions:
- Who is the client?
- Who else can pay the adviser?
- What happens if no purchase occurs?
- Which conclusions require a separately appointed specialist?
- Who owns and may reuse the research and vehicle records?
